EHLM 9th meeting, September 18, 2024
The 9th meeting of the Eastern Hemisphere Language & Metaphysics Network will take place on Wednesday, September 18, 2024. Please note that the 9th meeting will be a hybrid meeting. See below for details.
9th meeting:
In-person participation: Room 708, 7th floor of 14th Building, KomabaI Campus, the University of Tokyo.
Online participation through Zoom. Registration here.
Schedule (Japan, Korea):
- 1:00 – 1:05pm: Introductory remarks
- 1:05 – 2:25pm: Youichi Matsusaka (Tokyo Metropolitan University):
“The Role of Coordination in Belief Reports”
(talk for 45~50 minutes, the remainder for Q & A). - 2:25 – 2:35pm: Break
- 2:35 – 3:55pm: Paolo Bonardi (University of Vienna):
“Millian Russellianism, Cognitive Coordination, and Token Attitudes“
(talk for 45~50 minutes, the remainder for Q & A). - 3:55 – 4:00pm: Closing remark
China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong: -1 hr
Sydney & Melbourne: +1 hr.
New Zealand: +3 hrs.
Youichi Matsusaka: “The Role of Coordination in Belief Reports”
Abstract: Frege’s puzzle remains a central issue in the philosophy of language. In this talk, I will review a particular type of attempt, called “relationism”, to block substitution of coreferential terms in belief reports. In the course of that, I will explore the nature of the notion of coordination as advanced by various authors, though under different names. In the end, I will propose a way of understanding what we are doing when we make de dicto reports of others’ beliefs.
Paolo Bonardi: “Millian Russellianism, Cognitive Coordination, and Token Attitudes”
Abstract: Modes of presentation play a central role in the philosophy of language, not only for Fregean philosophers but also for Millian-Russellian philosophers. Nevertheless, they face a major problem: their identity conditions are unclear. In my talk, I will argue that there is no persuasive solution to this problem. Therefore, I will propose to first eliminate modes of presentation at the semantic level, thereby adopting the Millian-Russellian semantics as a theory of semantic content. Subsequently, I will also eliminate modes of presentation at the cognitive and pragmatic levels, arguing that the cognitive and pragmatic roles typically attributed to modes of presentation by Millian-Russellian philosophers can be fulfilled by a non-semantic but merely cognitive relation, cognitive coordination (for which I will provide a definition), and by very fine-grained token attitudes (comparable in granularity to occurrences of Russellian propositions), for which I will provide suitable identity conditions.
