Eastern Hemisphere Language & Metaphysics Network 8th online meeting
Wednesday, April 17, 2024
Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)
- 9.00 – 9.05am: Welcome and introductory remarks.
- 9.05 – 9.45am: Sam Baron, Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing and James Norton
“Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance”.
Presented by Sam Baron (University of Melbourne) and James Norton (University of Tasmania) - 9.45 – 9.55am: Comments by Jessica Pohlmann (Australian Catholic University)
- 9.55 – 10.20am: Q & A.
- 10.20 – 10.30am: Break.
- 10.30 – 11.10am: Akiko Frischhut (Sophia University, Tokyo)
“Awareness Without Time”. - 11.10 – 11.20am: Comments by Nicholas K. Rimell (Chinese University of Hong Kong).
- 11.20 – 11.45am: Q & A.
- 11.45 – 11.50am: Closing remarks.
Japan, Korea: +1 hrs
Sydney & Melbourne: +3 hrs.
New Zealand: +5 hrs.
＊Sam Baron, Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing and James Norton,
“Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance”
Presented by Sam Baron (University of Melbourne) and James Norton (University of Tasmania)
Abstract:
Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. In light of this, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time and effort between different methods, in order to maximise our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method may deserve to be allocated some of these resources.
Commentator: Jessica Pohlmann (Australian Catholic University)
＊Akiko Frischhut (Sophia University, Tokyo),
“Awareness Without Time”
Abstract:
Recently, contemporary philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Some examples may include dreams, trances and deep meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This article aims to give a coherent conceptualization of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on the phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’, that is, duration without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the talk will expand on a coherent account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession.
Commentator: Nicholas K. Rimell (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
